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The European Union (EU) is not de jure a federation, but after 50 years of 
institutional evolution it possesses attributes of a federal state. One can conclude 
that EU is “something between” federation and intergovernmental organization. If 
we measure  “something between” by interval [0, 1], where 0 means fully 
intergovernmental organization and 1 means de facto federation, the questions are: 
What is the location of recent EU on this interval? What tendency of development 
of this location can be observed in time? In this paper we propose such a measure 
based on game-theoretical model of European Union decision making system. 
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1. European Union: an intergovernmental organization or 
federation?  
 
Unions of  states  consist of member states with national 
governments  and  of some forms of  supranational institutions.  The 
constitutional framework of a union follows from Treaties among all 
member states. 
 
One can consider two forms of governance in the union: Inter-
governmental arrangement, when any decision-making is based on 
consensus of sovereign governments of all member states, and 
supranational institutions are coordinating execution of unanimous 
decisions. Federal arrangement, when member states transfer parts of 
their decision-making sovereignty to supranational institutions. 
 
While intergovernmental arrangement is based on union 
understood as an international organization, federation is a union 
comprising a number of partially self-governing states or regions united 
by a central ("federal") government. In a federation, the self-governing 
status of the member states is typically constitutionally entrenched and 
may not be altered by a unilateral decision of the central government. 
 
The form of government or constitutional structure found in a 
federation is known as federalism. It can be considered the opposite of 
another system, the unitary state. 
 
A unitary state is sometimes one with only a single, centralized, 
national tier of government. However, unitary states often also include 
one or more self-governing regions. The difference between a   2 
federation and this kind of unitary state is that in a unitary state the 
autonomous status of self-governing regions exists by the sufferance of 
the central government, and may be unilaterally revoked. While it is 
common for a federation to be brought into being by agreement 
between formally independent states, in a unitary state self-governing 
regions are often created through a process of devolution, where a 
formerly centralized state agrees to grant autonomy to a region that was 
previously entirely subordinate. 
 
The European Union (EU) is not de jure a federation, but after 50 
years of institutional evolution it possesses attributes of a federal state. 
However, its central government is far weaker than that of most 
federations and the individual members are sovereign states under 
international law, so it is usually characterized as an unprecedented 
form of supra-national union. The EU has responsibility for important 
areas such as trade, monetary union, agriculture, fisheries, and today 
around sixty per cent of the legislation in member-states originates in 
the institutions of the Union. Nonetheless, EU member-states retain the 
right to act independently in matters of foreign policy and defense, and 
also enjoy a near monopoly over other major policy areas such as 
criminal justice and taxation. The proposed Treaty of Lisbon would 
codify the Member States’ right to leave the Union, but would at the 
same time also provide the European Union with significantly more 
power in many areas. The European Union is being given "legal 
personality" and taking unto itself powers that it formerly exercised 
only in a representative capacity for the Member States. Different 
concepts of federalism in the EU and problems with Lisbon Treaty are 
discussed e.g. in Jovanovic (2005, 54-88). 
 
One can conclude that EU is “something between” federation and 
inter-governmental organization. If we measure “something between” 
by interval [0, 1], where 0 means fully intergovernmental organization 
and 1 means de facto federation, the questions are: What is the location 
of recent EU governance on this interval? What  tendency in 
development of this location can be observed in time? 
 
In this paper we propose such a measure based on game-
theoretical model of European Union decision making system. Actors 
of EU decision making are Council of Ministers (representing 
governments of member states), European Commission (representing 
super-national interests) and European Parliament (composed of   3 
European political parties groups, directly elected and representing 
citizens interests on political basis). While decision making involving 
Council of Ministers comprises inter-governmental element in 
European Union governance, decision making involving European 
Commission and European Parliament represents elements of federal 
governance of the EU. Then we can look what is an “influence” or 
“power” of Council of Ministers and national governments in the EU 
decision making compared to  “influence” or power of supranational 
institutions not directly linked to national governments (Commission 
and the European Parliament). Location of the EU on the scale of the 
“ fully intergovernmental” and  “fully federal” governance can be 
estimated by comparison of decision making power of its inter-
governmental body (Council) and supranational bodies (Commission 
and the European Parliament). 
 
In discussions about distribution of decisional power in the EU 
only the distribution of voting weights in the Council of Ministers 
qualified majority voting is usually taken into account. In contrast to that, 
in this paper we analyze models of consultation and co-decision 
procedures in decision-making of the European Union institutions: 
Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament. While 
consultation procedure is a “game” between Council and Commission 
with agenda setting role of Commission and consultation role of the 
European Parliament, co-decision procedure involves all three most 
important European institution providing each of them with unconditional 
veto right. Table 1 illustrates broad use of consultation and co-decision 
procedures in legislative acts decided by European Union institutions 
during 2000-2006. Consultation and co-decision are usual methods of 
European governance and Council of Ministers is not an exclusive 
decision maker in the EU. In this paper, u sing power indices 
methodology, a distribution of influence among Commission, Council 
and the Parliament under different decision making procedures is being 
evaluated, together with voting power of member states and European 







   4 
Table 1 
Number of legislative proposals under consultation and co-decision 
procedures 2000-2006 
 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
CNP  150  140  118  152  121  132  126 
CDP  94  84  140  117  73  88  112 
 
Source: PreLex database (http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/rech_simple.cfm?CL=en) 
CNP = consultation procedure, CDP = co-decision procedure. 
 
The inter-institutional distribution of power (among Commission, 
Council and European Parliament) in decision making procedures of the 
EU (consultation procedure, and  co-decision procedure) had been 
analyzed in Widgrén (1996), Laruelle and Widgrén (1997) and Napel 
and Widgrén (2004). While in the first paper (Widgrén (1996)) 
traditional committee model is developed for consultation procedure 
(consultation procedure as a  committee of n member states plus 
Commission with composite voting rule), other models are formulated 
in terms of three unitary actors (Commission, Council and Parliament) 
extensive form games, without decomposition of the Council into 
member states and the Parliament into party factions. European multi-
cameral procedures were studied also by Kö nig and Bräuninger (2001) 
by explicit analysis of winning coalitions in multi-cameral decision 
making, but without formulation of corresponding voting game model. 
Traditional power indices approach to disaggregate modeling of 
consultation and co-decision procedure, allowing express both inter-
institutional and intra-institutional influence was presented in Turnovec 
(2004, 2008a, 2008b). In this paper we extend this stream of models 
associating influence of member states governments in the Council of 
Ministers voting with inter-governmentalist attributes, and the influence 
of Commission and Parliament (European political parties) in basic 
legislative procedures with federalist attributes of the European Union. 
 
2. Methodology: Committees and voting power  
 
Let n be a positive integer, w = (w1, w2, … , wn) be a nonnegative 
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By a weighted majority game of n members (Owen 1982) we mean 
a triple [N, q, w] in which N = {1, 2, … , n}. Number wi is called a weight 
of member i, q is called a quota, any subset S ˝ N is called a coalition in 




i q w and losing one 
otherwise. Weighted majority game provides a model of a simple voting 
committee (single camera committee in which each member has one 
weight). 
 
Models of simple voting committees and committee systems are 
applicable to political science, as they provide instruments for analysis 
of a priori voting power of their members. Voting power analysis seeks 
an answer to the following question: Given a simple voting committee or 
a committee system, what is an influence of its members over the 
outcome of voting? Voting power of a member i is a probability that i will 
be decisive in the sense that such situation appears in which she would be 
able to reverse the outcome of voting by reversing her vote. To define a 
particular power measure means to identify some qualitative property 
(decisiveness) whose presence or absence in voting process can be 
established and quantified (e.g. Nurmi 1997). 
 
Voting power analysis seeks an answer to the following question: 
Given a simple  voting committee ] , , [ w q N , what is an influence of its 
members over the outcome of voting? Absolute v oting power of a 
member i is defined as a probability  ] , , [ Π w q N i  that i will be decisive in 
the sense that such situation appears in which she would be able to decide 
the outcome of voting by her vote (Nurmi (1997)), and a relative voting 
power as 


















Two basic concepts of decisiveness are used: swing position as an 
ability of individual voter to change by unilateral switch from YES to NO 
outcome of voting, and pivotal position, such position of individual voter 
in a permutation of voters expressing ranking of attitudes of members to 
voted issue (from most preferable to least preferable) and corresponding 
order of forming of winning configuration, in which her vote YES means 
YES outcome of voting and her vote NO means NO outcome of voting in 
the committee. 
   6 
Let us denote by si(N, q, w) the number of swing positions of i-th 
member and by p i (N, q,  w) the number of pivotal positions of i - th 
member in simple voting committee [N, q, w].  
 
Assuming many voting acts and all configurations equally likely, it 
makes sense to evaluate a priori voting power of each member of the 
committee by probability to have a swing, measured by absolute Penrose-






Nq - P= w  
(si is the number of swings of the member i and 2
n - 1 is the number of 
configurations with i). 
 
To compare relative power of different committee members, 














Assuming many voting acts and all possible preference orderings 
equally likely, it makes sense to evaluate an a priori voting power of each 
committee member as a probability of being in pivotal situation, 
measured b y Shapley-Shubik (SS) power index (Shapley and Shubik 
(1954)): 







P= w  
(pi is the number of pivotal positions of the committee member i, and n! is 



















i.e. absolute and relative form of the SS-power index is the same.
1 
                                                 
1 Supporters of Penrose-Banzhaf power concept are sometimes refusing Shapley-Shubik index as a 
measure of voting power. Their objections to Shapley-Shubik power concept are based on classification 
of power measures on so called I-power (voter’s potential influence over the outcome of voting) and P 
power (expected relative share in a fixed prize available to the winning group of committee members , 
based on cooperative game theory) introduced by Felsenthal, Machover and Zwicker (1998). Shapley-
Shubik power index was declared to represent P-power and as such unusable for measuring influence in 
voting. We tried to show (Turnovec (2007), Turnovec, Mercik, Mazurkiewicz (2008)) that objections 
against Shapley-Shubik power index, based on its interpretation as a P - power concept, are not 
sufficiently justified. Both Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf measure could be successfully derived 
as cooperative game values, and at the same time both of them can be interpreted as probabili ties of 
being in some decisive position (pivot, swing) without using cooperative game theory at all .  
   7 
 
Let C 1 = [N1, q 1, w1] and C 2 = [N2, q 2, w2] be a pair of simple 
voting committees. Then wij (j = 1, 2) denotes the weight of member i˛Nj 
in Cj, and qj is the quota in committee Cj. Let N = N1¨N2. By  1 w and  2 w  
we denote zero extension of weight vectors w1, w2 with respect to N = 
N1¨N2 such that  ij ij w w = if i ˛ Nj and  0 = ij w  if i ˇ Nj. Let S1˝N1 be a 
coalition in C1 and S2˝N2 be a coalition in C2, then S = S1¨S2 ˝ N is a 
joint coalition of members of C 1  and C 2 . We assume that the same 
members (if any) vote identically in both committees. Simple voting 
committee  ] , , [ 2 1 j j j w q N N C ¨ =  we  call a zero extension of C j  with 
respect to N 1 ¨ N 2 . Considering an interrelated system of two simple 
voting committees with different (possibly overlapping) sets of members 
in which final outcome of voting depends on result of voting in both 
committees we h ave to substitute the corresponding  simple voting 
committees by their zero extensions with the same sets of members.  
   
The union C1¨C2 of two committees C 1 = [N1, q1, w1] and C 2 = 
[N2, q2, w2] is the committee  2 1 C C ¨ = [N1¨N2, q1￿q2,  1 w ,  2 w ] with the 
following composite voting rule: a proposal to be passed has to obtain 
votes representing at least total weight q1 in committee C1 or at least total 
weight q2 in committee C2. A coalition S˝N1¨N2 such that S = S 1¨S2, 
S1˝N1, S2˝N2 is a winning coalition in C1¨C2 if S1 is winning coalition 
in C1 or S2 is winning coalition in C2, The set of all winning coalitions in 
C1¨C2 is equal to the union of the sets of all winning coalitions in  ! C  and 
2 C .  
 
The intersection C1˙C2 of two committees C1 = [N1, q1, w1] and C2 
= [N2, q2, w2] is the committee  2 1 C C ˙ = [N1¨N2, q1￿q2,  1 w ,  2 w ] with 
the following composite voting rule: a proposal to be passed has to obtain 
votes representing at least total weight q 1 in committee C1 and at least 
total weight q 2 in committee C 2. A coalition S ˝N 1¨N 2 such that S = 
S1¨S2, S 1˝N 1, S 2˝N 2 is a winning coalition in C 1¨C 2 if S 1 is winning 
coalition in C1 and S2 is winning coalition in C2, The set of all winning 
coalitions in C1˙C2 is equal to the intersection of the sets of all winning 
coalitions in  ! C  and  2 C .  
 
Using union and intersection operations we can construct logical 
combinations of  simple voting committees. For example, [N1¨N2¨N3, 
(q1￿q2)￿q3,  1 w , 2 w , 3 w ] is a logical combination of three simple voting   8 
committees [N1, q 1, w1], [N2, q 2, w2], [N3, q 3, w3] with the following 
composite voting rule: a proposal to be passed has to obtain either at least 
q1 weights in simple voting committee [N1, q1, w1] and at least q2 weights 
in simple voting committee [N2, q2, w2], or at least q3 weights in simple 
voting  committee [N3, q 3, w3]. Logical combinations of simple voting 
committees provide models of committee systems (committees in which 
each member has more weights or multi-camera committees consisting of 
several simple voting committees and complex voting rules). 
 
Definition of swings and pivots can be easily extended for logical 




Let C 1  = [N1, q1, w1]  and C 2  = [N2, q2, w2]  be two  simple 
committees,  2 1 C C ˙  be their intersection, 2 1 C C ¨  be their union, 
i˛N1¨N2, si be the number of swings and pi be the number of pivots of 
member i, then 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 C s C s C C s C C s i i i i + = ˙ + ¨  
and 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 C p C p C C p C C p i i i i + = ˙ + ¨ ￿ 
 
Proof: see in Turnovec (2008a, 158) 
 
From Proposition 1 it follows that 
 








i P + P = ˙ P + ¨ P  
and 








i P + P = ˙ P + ¨ P  
 
Proposition 2  
 
Len N is the set of members of a simple voting committee and 
SS π is the vector of Shapley-Shubik power indices  (by definition its 
component 
SS
i p  is the probability that member i is in pivotal situation). If 
N R ˝  is a group of committee members, then ￿
˛R i
SS
i p is the probability 
that group R is in pivotal situation in the sense that somebody of its 
members is pivotal.￿ 
   9 
From Proposition 2 it follows that using SS-power index measure 
we can evaluate power of any subgroups of members by sum of power in 
dices of its members. Penrose-Banzhaf power index does not have this 
property.  
 
3. Models of q ualified majority, consultation and co-decision 
procedures 
 
We shall use concept of logical combinations of simple voting 
committees for construction of simplified models of the EU decision 
making and evaluation of influence of different actors (national 
governments, European political parties) and institutions (Council of 
Ministers, Commission, European Parliament). In the models we are 
using the following notations:  
N  set of members states (i = 1, 2, … , n), 
N¨{1} set of actors in consultation procedure (member states 
governments plus Commission), 
  M  set of factions in European Parliament (European political 
parties), 
  vi  number of votes assigned to member state i,  
  sj  number of seats of European political party j, 
  v  vector of member states votes in the Council (vote weights, 
as defined in Nice),  
  p  vector of shares of member states population, 
  e  summation vector (one state –  one vote weights), 
  s  vector of “weights” (numbers of seats) of political parties in 
the European Parliament,  
  q  votes quota in the Council (minimal number of votes 
required to pass a proposal), 
  c  member states majority quota in the Council (minimal 
number of member states required to pass a proposal), 
  r  a population majority quota in the Council (the countries 
supporting the proposal must represent at least r% of total population of 
the member states supporting the proposal), 
  t  a majority quota in the European Parliament (minimal 
number of the members of EP required to pass a proposal). 
 
  x
(-k) ˛ Rn+k   denotes left zero extension of x (first k components 
are equal zero), 
  x
(+k) ˛ Rn+k  denotes right zero extension of x (last k components 
are equal zero),   10 
  e(n,j) ˛ Rn   denotes the n-dimensional unit vector with j-th 
component equal to 1, all other components equal 0. 
 
In Table 2 we provide voting weights and quotas used in different 
procedures of European Union decision making.   11 


























Council of Ministers               
Germany  29  8,41  82,10  16,71  1  3,70    
France  29  8,41  61,40  12,49  1  3,70    
UK  29  8,41  60,50  12,31  1  3,70    
Italy  29  8,41  58,00  11,80  1  3,70    
Spain  27  7,83  44,70  9,10  1  3,70    
Poland  27  7,83  38,10  7,75  1  3,70    
Romania  14  4,06  21,70  4,42  1  3,70    
Netherlands  13  3,77  16,50  3,36  1  3,70    
Greece  12  3,48  11,10  2,26  1  3,70    
Portugal  12  3,48  10,60  2,16  1  3,70    
Belgium  12  3,48  10,40  2,12  1  3,70    
Czech R.  12  3,48  10,30  2,10  1  3,70    
Hungary  12  3,48  10,00  2,04  1  3,70    
Sweden  10  2,90  9,10  1,85  1  3,70    
Austria  10  2,90  8,30  1,69  1  3,70    
Bulgaria  10  2,90  7,70  1,57  1  3,70    
Slovakia  7  2,03  5,40  1,10  1  3,70    
Denmark  7  2,03  5,40  1,10  1  3,70    
Finland  7  2,03  5,20  1,06  1  3,70    
Island  7  2,03  4,20  0,85  1  3,70    
Lithuania  7  2,03  3,40  0,69  1  3,70    
Latvia  4  1,16  2,30  0,47  1  3,70    
Slovenia  4  1,16  2,00  0,41  1  3,70    
Estonia  4  1,16  1,30  0,26  1  3,70    
Cyprus  4  1,16  0,80  0,16  1  3,70    
Luxembourg  4  1,16  0,50  0,10  1  3,70    
Malta  3  0,87  0,40  0,08  1  3,70    
European Parliament               
EPP-ED              277  35,29 
PES              218  27,77 
ALDE              105  13,38 
UEN              44  5,61 
Greens-EFA              42  5,35 
GUE-NGL              41  5,22 
IND-DEM              23  2,93 
ITS              21  2,68 
NI              14  1,78 
Total  345  100  491,40  100  27  100  785  100,00 
Quotas               
quota Nice  255  73,91%  304,67  62%  14  50,01%  393  50,01 
quota Lisbon      319,41  65%  15  55%  393  50,01 
quota SR              393  50,01 
Source: http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index_en.htm   12 
3.1 Council of Ministers: qualified majority problem  
 
Most of the analyses of the EU decision making are focused on 
voting in the Council. Distribution of power in the EU Council of 
Ministers and European and the development associated with the 1995, 
2004 and 2007 enlargement of the EU has been analyzed in Brams and 
Affuso (1985), Widgrén (1994, 1995), Turnovec (1996, 2001, 2002), 
Bindseil and Hantke (1997), Laruelle (1998), Steunenberg, Smidtchen 
and Koboldt (1999),  Nurmi (2000), Nurmi, Meskanen and Pajala 
(2001), K őnig and Brauninger (2001), Leech (2002), Felsenthal and 
Machover (2004a, 2004b), Hosli and Machover (2004), Plechanovová 
(2004), Baldwin and Widgrén (2004), S ł omczyński and  Życzkowski 
(2006, 2007), Hosli (2008), Leech and Azis (2008) and many others. 
Also in political discussions the problem of influence in Council voting 
is presented as the crucial one, as a corner stone of national influence in 
the EU decision making. Let us shortly resume models of qualified 
majority voting in terms of unions and intersections of simple voting 
committees. 
 
3.1.1 Status quo qualified majority, the Nice Treaty 
 
  By Nice Treaty (2000) a qualified majority in the Council 
voting in recent EU is reached if the following three conditions are met: 
a)  minimum of 255 votes of member states is cast in favor of the 
proposal, out of a total of 345 votes, 
b) a majority of Member states approve the proposal,
2 
c)  votes in favor represent at least 62% of the total population of 
the Union. 
  
Each member state has a fixed number of votes. The number of 
votes allocated to each country is roughly determined by its population, 
but progressively weighted in favor of less populated countries (see 
Table 2). 
 
  Let us consider three weighted majority games: 
        C1 = [N, q, v] 
        C2 = [N, r, p] 
        C3 = [N, c, e] 
                                                 
2 In some cases (when the Council is not acting on a proposal of Commission) two-thirds majority is 
required.   13 
where N is the set of member states (n = card (N) is the number of 
member states), q is the quota of votes, v is the vector of Member States 
votes, r is the population quota, p is the vector of Member States shares of 
population (in %), c = int (n/2) + 1 is the member states quota and e is a 
summation vector (one state one vote). The Nice qualified majority rule 
can be modeled as committee system generated by the intersection of C1, 
C2, and C3: 
 
    CQMN = C1˙C2˙C3 = [N, q￿r￿c, v, p, e] 
 
In EU27 n = 27, q = 345, r = 62%, c = 14 (member states weights 
and quotas see in Table 2).  
 
3.1.2 Controversial future, Lisbon Treaty qualified majority  
 
If the Lisbon Treaty (2007) comes into force, qualified majority 
rule will be simplified. In this case, for passing a proposal in the 
Council, a “double majority” of at least 55% of the member states
3 that 
represent at least 65% of the population of the Union is required. In 
addition, a proposal backed by n-3 member states is always adopted, 
even if they do not represent 65% of population. 
 
  Let us consider three weighted majority games: 
 
      C1 = [N, r, p] 
      C2 = [N, c1, e] 
      C3 = [N, c2, e] 
 
where N is the set of member states (n = card (N) is the number of 
member states),  r is the population quota, p is the vector of Member 
States shares of population (in %), c1 = int (55n/100) + 1 is the member 
states quota, c 2  = n - 3 is alternative member states quota and  e is a 
summation vector (one state one vote).The Lisbon qualified majority rule 
can be modeled as a committee system generated by the intersection of 
C1and C2, and union of (C1˙C2) and C3: 
 
  CQML = (C1˙C2)¨C3 = [N, (r￿c1)￿c2, p, e, e], c2 > c1 
 
                                                 
3 When the Council is not acting on a proposal of Commission, majority of 72% of member states is 
required.   14 
In EU27 r = 65%, c1 = 15, c2 = 24 (member states weights and 
quotas see in Table 2). 
 
3.2 Council and Commission: Consultation procedure  
 
We assume that voting in the Commission is not influenced by 
citizenship of Commissioners and by their ideological preferences, 
Commission is deciding as a collective body and results of its voting are 
not known. 
 
The European Commission sends its proposal to both the Council 
of Ministers and European Parliament, but it is the Council that 
officially consults Parliament and other bodies. However, the Council is 
not bound by Parliament’s position, so the Parliament can not change 
the proposal or prevent its adoption. Then Council either approves the 
proposal by qualified majority or rejects it by blocking minority, or 
amends it by unanimity. Depending on the version of qualified majority 
in the Council we have three models of consultation procedure. 
 
3.2.1 Status quo: Nice version of consultation procedure 
 
From committee system for qualified majority CQMN = [N, q￿r￿c, 
v, p, e] we obtain the following model of consultation procedure: 
 






The proposal is accepted if it is supported by Commission and 
approved by Nice qualified majority in the Council (not less than q = 
345 votes, at least r = 62% of population and at least c = 14 member 
states), or changed if it has unanimity support of all n member states in 
the Council, even if the change is not supported by Commission. 
 
3.2.2 Lisbon version of consultation procedure 
 






The proposal is accepted if it is supported by Commission and 
approved by Constitution qualified majority in the Council (at least r = 
65% of population and at least c1 = 55% of member states, or at least 24 
member states even without population quota, or changed if it has 
unanimity support, even if the change is not supported by Commission).   15 
3.3 Co-decision procedure 
 
Co-decision procedure was introduced in 1992 (Maastricht) and 
modified in 1997 (Amsterdam). 
  
New legislative proposal is drafted by Commission and submitted 
to the Council and the Parliament.  In t he first reading the Council 
adopts by  qualified majority  „common position“, including 
amendments, and EP approves by simple majority its position including 
amendments.  If the two institutions have agreed on the  same 
amendments after the first reading, the proposal becomes law. 
Otherwise there is a second reading in each  institution, where each 
considers the others’ amendments. If the institutions are unable to reach 
agreement after second reading, a conciliation committee is set up with 
equal number of members of Parliament and Council. The committee 
attempts to negotiate a compromise text which must be approved by 
both institutions. Both Parliament and Council have the power to reject 
a proposal either in second reading or following conciliation, causing 
the proposal to fall. Commission may also withdraw its proposal in any 
time. 
 
European Parliament of the EU of 27 has 785 members in 8 
political groups (European political parties): European People’s Party-
European Democrats (EPP-ED), Group of the Party of  European 
Socialists (PES), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE), Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), European Greens –  
European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA), European United Left –  Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL), Independence and Democracy (IND-DEM), 
Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS), Non Attached (NI).Distribution 
of seats  among political groups see in Table 2, national representation 
in EP is roughly proportional to the population. Voting quota in EP is 
393 votes (simple majority). 
 
We assume that the European Parliament represents interests of 
citizens and acts on the basis of ideological principles expressed by 
European political parties, hence voting in the Parliament is in not 
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3.3.1 Nice version of co-decision procedure 
 
From committee system for qualified majority CQMN = [N, q￿r￿c, 
v, p, e] we obtain the model  
 






The proposal is accepted if it is supported by Commission, 
approved by Nice qualified majority in the Council (more than q = 345 
votes, at least r = 62% of population and at least c = 14 member states), 
and by required majority in the European Parliament (t = 393). 
 
3.3.2 Lisbon version of co-decision procedure 
 
The only difference in Lisbon version of co-decision procedure is 
in Council qualified majority CQML = (C1˙C2)¨C3 = [N, (r￿c1)￿c2, p, e, 
e], c2 > c1. In this case the model of co-decision procedure will look as 
follows: 







The proposal is accepted if it is supported by Commission and 
approved by Lisbon qualified majority in the Council (at least r = 65% 
of population and at least c1 = 55% of member states, or at least c2 = 24 
member states even without population quota), and by required majority 
in the European Parliament (t = 393). 
 
4. Empirical findings 
 
  In Table 3 we provide Shapley-Shubik power indices calculated for 
three different procedures (qualified majority, consultation procedure and 
co-decision procedure) in two alternative settings (Nice, Lisbon). For 
calculations we applied Proposition 1, to evaluate aggregate voting power 
(influence) of different institutions, we applied Proposition 2. To follow 
development of inter-institutional division of influence in time, in Table 
4 we provide results of EU15 based on before Nice Treaty decision 
making arrangement. 
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Table 3 
Inter-institutional and intra-institutional power in EU27 legislative procedures 









  Nice  Lisabon  Nice  Lisbon  Nice  Lisbon 
  SS power  SS power   SS power  SS power  SS power  SS power 
Germany  0,0875  0,1596  0,0651  0,1087  0,055  0,067 
France  0,0871  0,1112  0,0648  0,0754  0,0546  0,0473 
UK  0,0871  0,1094  0,0648  0,0742  0,0546  0,0465 
Italy  0,0869  0,1044  0,0647  0,0708  0,0545  0,0444 
Spain  0,0804  0,0784  0,0597  0,0532  0,0501  0,0349 
Poland  0,0799  0,0674  0,0593  0,046  0,0497  0,0306 
Romania  0,0398  0,0417  0,0299  0,0282  0,0243  0,0181 
Netherlands  0,0367  0,0327  0,0275  0,0222  0,0222  0,0149 
Greece  0,034  0,024  0,0256  0,0164  0,0206  0,0118 
Portugal  0,034  0,0232  0,0256  0,0158  0,0206  0,0115 
Belgium  0,034  0,0229  0,0256  0,0156  0,0206  0,0114 
Czech R.  0,034  0,0227  0,0256  0,0155  0,0206  0,0113 
Hungary  0,034  0,0223  0,0256  0,0152  0,0206  0,0111 
Sweden  0,028  0,0208  0,0214  0,0143  0,0169  0,0107 
Austria  0,028  0,0196  0,0214  0,0134  0,0169  0,0102 
Bulgaria  0,028  0,0186  0,0214  0,0128  0,0169  0,0099 
Slovakia  0,0195  0,015  0,0152  0,0105  0,0117  0,0086 
Denmark  0,0195  0,015  0,0152  0,0105  0,0117  0,0086 
Finland  0,0195  0,0147  0.0152  0,0102  0,0117  0,0085 
Ireland  0,0195  0,0131  0,0152  0,0091  0,0117  0,0079 
Lithuania  0,0195  0,0119  0,0152  0,0083  0,0117  0,0075 
Latvia  0,011  0,0102  0,0152  0,0072  0,0117  0,0069 
Slovenia  0,011  0,0098  0,0092  0,0069  0,0066  0,0068 
Estonia  0,011  0,0087  0,0092  0,0062  0,0066  0,0064 
Cyprus  0,011  0,0079  0,0092  0,0057  0,0066  0,0062 
Luxembourg  0,011  0,0075  0,0092  0,0054  0,0065  0,0059 
Malta  0,0081  0,0073  0,0071  0,0053  0,0048  0,0059 
Council  100  100  0,7631  0,683  0,62  0,4708 
Commission    0,2369  0,317  0,2547  0,3236 
Parliament        0,1253  0,2056 
EPP-ED  277        0,0504  0,079 
PES  218        0,0306  0,0516 
ALDE  105        0,0209  0,0327 
UEN  44        0,0049  0,0121 
Greens-EFA  42        0,0049  0,0121 
GUE-NGL  41        0,0049  0,0121 
IND-DEM  23        0,0029  0,002 
ITS  21        0,0029  0,0,02 
NI  14        0,0029  0,002 
  785        0,1253  0,2056 
Source: own calculations (Turnovec 2008a) 
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Table 4 
Inter-institutional and intra-institutional power in EU15 legislative procedures 














    SS power   SS power  SS power 
Germany  10  0,1166  0,0851  0,0614 
France  10  0,1166  0,0851  0,0614 
UK  10  0,1166  0,0851  0,0614 
Italy  10  0,1166  0,0851  0,0614 
Spain  8  0,0955  0,0704  0,0456 
Netherlands  5  0,0552  0,0418  0,0280 
Greece  5  0,0552  0,0418  0,0280 
Portugal  5  0,0552  0,0418  0,0280 
Belgium  5  0,0552  0,0418  0,0280 
Sweden  4  0,0454  0,0352  0,0241 
Austria  4  0,0454  0,0352  0,0241 
Denmark  3  0,0353  0,0284  0,0158 
Finland  3  0,0353  0,0284  0,0158 
Ireland  3  0,0353  0,0284  0,0158 
Luxembourg  2  0,0206  0,0183  0,0117 
Council  87  1,00  0,7519  0,5105 
Commission    0,2481  0,3055 
Parliament      0,1840 
EPP  232      0,0743 
PES  181      0,0400 
UFE  30      0,0105 
ELDR  52      0,0190 
EUL/NGL  42      0,0142 
GGEP  46      0,0161 
IEN  16      0,0043 
IND  19      0,0043 
NA  8      0,0013 
  626       
Source: Own calculations, Turnovec F. (2004, 2008b) 
Abbreviations of political groups in the European Parliament: PES Party of European Socialists, EPP 
European Peoples Party, UFE Union for Europe, ELDR European Liberal, Democratic and Reform 
Party, EUL/NGL European United Left —  Nordic Green Left, GGEP Green Group in the European 
Parliament, IEN Independent Europe of Nations, IND Independents, NA Not affiliated. 
 
The qualified majority required at that time was at least 62 votes in 
the Council of Ministers out of 87 (for Member States weights see 
column  “weights”).  A simple majority in the European Parliament 
(electoral term 1994-2004) required at least 314 votes out of 626, and 
ideologically motivated voting is assumed (the distribution of seats 
among 9 factions of the European Parliament see the column “weights,” 
Parliament section). The rules of consultation and co-decision procedures   19 
were (except for the definition of a qualified majority) the same as 
described in section 3. 
 
In case of consultation procedure Lisbon qualified majority rule 
increases power of Commission compared to Nice (and power of Council 
as an aggregate power of member states is declining). In co-decision 
procedure, where we have three institutional actors  - Council, 
Commission and Parliament, we can observe the same tendency: Lisbon 
increases power of Commission and Parliament and decreases power of 
Council compared to Nice and decreases power of Council compared to 
Lisbon. Moreover, in the co-decision procedure the influence of big 
European political parties can be compared to the influence of  big 
member states, so the political or ideological dimension of European 
Union decision making becomes measurably more important than in 
earlier stages of the EU development. The influence of member states is 
procedurally dependent and differs from their i nternal influence in the 
Council of Ministers internal voting not only by size, but also by 
structure. 
 
In Table 5 we summarize inter-institutional influence in EU15 
and EU27. In EU27 we consider two options: the effects of Nice Treaty 




Intergovernmental versus federal elements in European Union decision making  
 
  EU15  EU27 
  before Nice rules  Nice rules  Lisbon rules 
  QM  CNP  CDP  QM  CNP  CDP  QM  CNP  CDP 
Council  1  0,7519  0,5105  1  0,7631  0,62  1  0,683  0,4708 
Commission  0  0,2481  0,3055  0  0,2369  0,2547  0  0,317  0,3236 
EP  0  0  0,184  0  0  0,1253  0  0  0,2056 
Intergovernmental power  1  0,7519  0,5105  1  0,7631  0,62  1  0,683  0,4708 
Federal power  0  0,2481  0,4895  0  0,2369  0,38  0  0,317  0,5292 
Source: own calculations 
 
Results demonstrate changes in inter-institutional influence of the 
three most important EU institutions  –  Council, Commission and 
Parliament. 
 
In EU15 before Nice decision making rules the inter-governmental 
element of EU governance (power of Council) represent about 75% in 
consultation procedure and 51% in co-decision procedure. Nice rules in   20 
extended EU27 increase inter-governmental character of the EU decision 
making (76% in consultation procedure and 62% in co-decision 
procedure). Lisbon Treaty rules decrease inter-governmental character of 
EU (68% in co-decision procedure and 47% in co-decision procedure) 
compared both to arrangement before Nice Treaty and Nice Treaty rules. 
 
Comparison of power of Council to power of Commission and 
Parliament in different procedures provides a very rough proxy of inter-
governmentalism and federalism evaluation.  Let 
QM
CM p is the power of 
Council of Ministers in unilateral decision making (not involving 
Commission  and European Parliament), 
CNP
CM p is the Council power in 
consultation procedure and 
CDP
CM p is power of the Council in co-decision 
procedure. In the same way let us denote power of Commission and 













EP p p p , , for Parliament). Denoting 
by QM l share of issues decided exclusively by the Council, by
CNP l share of 
issues decided by consultation procedure, and by  CDP l share of issues 
decided by co-decision procedure, then the overall evaluation of the 
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EP QM p l p l p l + +  
is the overall European Parliament power. Then the index of federalism in 
the EU can be defined as follows:  












Com QM p p l p p l p p l + + + + +  
Since power of Commission and Parliament in Council exclusive decision 
making is zero and power of Parliament in consultation procedure is zero, 
the index of federalization reduces to 






Com CNP p p l p l + +  
   
It is difficult to quantify shares of issues decided by different 
procedures. For example, if  
   
3
1
= = = CDP CNP QM l l l , 
then, before Nice Treaty arrangement, the index of federalism would be   21 






= +  
i.e. about 25%, Nice Treaty federalism index would be 






= +  
i.e. about 20%, and Lisbon Treaty federalism index would be 






= +  
i.e. about 2 8 %.  So,  the quantitative hypothesis (corresponding to the 
intuition) is that Lisbon Treaty increases federative elements in the EU. In 
fact, together with changes of voting weights and quotas we can observe 
shifts (increase) of shares of issues decided by c onsultation and co-
decision procedures and henceforth the changes toward federalism will be 
more intensive than follows from our analysis.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
  The author is aware of the fact that used models of consultation 
and co-decision procedures are highly simplified (assumption about 
equal probability of all possible pivotal positions, they do not reflect 
multi-stage character of the voting games and complex amendment 
process). But, under hypothesis that the models reflect basic features of 
legislative procedures, they lead to interesting conclusions. 
 
  Influence of member states in European Union decision making 
cannot be reduced to relative voting power in qualified majority voting 
in the Council independently of used legislative procedures, involving 
Commission and European Parliament. Consultation procedure (with 
explicit interaction of Commission and Council, where Commission has 
agenda setting authority), and co-decision procedure involving 
Commission, Council and European Parliament (with de facto 
unconditional veto right of all three institutions) affects distribution of 
inter-institutional voting power of EU institutions and intra-institutional 
voting power of decision making actors (member states and European 
political parties). 
 
  Ceteris paribus (constant shares of agenda packages decided 
exclusively by the Council, consultation procedure and by co-decision 
procedure), the Lisbon Treaty rules increase federative elements in the 
European Union compared to Nice Treaty arrangement and before Nice 
Treaty arrangement. In fact, we can observe growing share of agendas   22 
decided by consultation and co-decision procedures, what implies that 
increase of federalism index is stronger than indicated by our empirical 
findings. 
   
  Qualified majority, consultation and co-decision procedures can 
be  modeled  by instruments of  weighted majority games and power 
indices methodology can be used. Power indices methodology has its 
critics. What exactly power indices are measuring is controversial, see 
e.g. arguments of Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) about ignoring preferences, 
and response of Holler and Widgrén (1999), but they are of general 
interest to political science because they may measure players’ ability to 
get what they want. Admittedly significant share of decisions under the 
EU decision making procedures are taken without recourse to a formal 
vote. But it may well be the case that the outcome of negotiation is 
conditioned by the possibility that a vote could be taken, and than a priori 
evaluation of voting power matters. Moreover, analyses of institutional 
design of decision making could benefit from power indices methodology 
(Holler and Owen 2001, Lane and Berg 1999). Continuing research and 
deeper understanding of power indices methodology reflect an actual 
demand f or amendment of traditional legal and political analysis of 
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